Eisenhower Story

Another reason to like Ike.

A useful reminder of how doctrine isn't born fully formed and perfect, it's a result of constant testing and struggle against diverse circumstances.  There is a book waiting to be written comparing this with the Cuban missile crisis and MacArthur/Truman in Korea.

Scary Stuff

Via Marginal Revolution,

Wired has a choice article about an episode from early in Nixon's first term, wherein he tried to convince the Soviets that he was insane in order to end the Vietnam War.  The logic was that by convincing the Soviets that he was crazy enough to start a nuclear war, they would pressure Hanoi to fold.  And to convince the Soviets he was really crazy, he sent a squadron of B-52's loaded with nukes to skirt Soviet air defenses.

How many problems can you find in Nixon's thinking?  Try these:

• Pressuring USSR equals pressuring North Korea.
• Sending a squadron of bombers armed with nuclear weapons onto the edge of hostile airspace has no downside.
• It is in the interest of the United States to have countries with massive nuclear forces convinced that our president is insane.

How many of these delusions are present in the thinking of George W. Bush?

• Pressuring Destroying the government of Iraq pressures Al Qaeda.
• Sending air craft carrier squadrons into the Persian Gulf skirting Iranian territory carries no downside.
• It is in the interest of the United States to have the rest of the world convinced that our president is insane.

Review Excerpt: Fog of War

Some thoughts on Every War Must End.

I've heard the fog of war in reference to bureaucratic screw-ups, or as an excuse for friendly fire and other tactical mishaps. Here Ikle uses it to refer to the uncertainty at the top.

Strategic decisions have to incorporate a ton of data: friendly and enemy troop strength, reserves, and the potential for outside parties to intervene. Obviously a great deal of this information is unknown, it must be estimated based on a variety of sources. That layer of interpretation is the true fog, data interpretation follows self reinforcing assumptions. If we are tired they must be tired because ultimately we must win, therefore we will win. This ties in with the tendency for politicians to be to aggressive (if they lose a war they lose office- whether they leave their country intact or in ruins). Tyrants are actually more likely to make rational decisions about ending war then democracies, assuming the tyrant stays in power. Saddam Hussein in the first gulf war provides an apt demonstration.

Ikle makes the point that relatively little attention is paid to big picture strategy. When Rumsfeld talked to himself about whether we were creating more terrorists then we destroyed, that was taken as exceptional. Actually it was a very rational and very rarely asked question: Are we achieving our objectives?

I wonder how they process and present decision making information within the military? Any better then an insurance company?