Cumings' Korean War

I finished reading Bruce Cumings' Korean War this week.  This book is a thoughtful retrospective on what the Korean War means to Korea and the vast misconceptions that still define the conflict in the American consciousness.  It is not for the faint of heart, Cumings does not shy away from gory detail when he wants to make a point.  His views of North Korea are considerably more sympathetic than pretty much any other American author.  That was in fact why I picked up the book, dissidents may be right or wrong but they're almost always interesting.  I was not disappointed. 

Cumings describes a conflict that anticipates Iraq as much as it does Vietnam.  An ignorant and ill-prepared military occupation quickly followed by guerilla warfare, rampant atrocities against civilians committed by American troops and the Korean forces they empowered, and driving it all an arrogant belief in the inerrancy of American military power.  It is tragic that Korea is our forgotten war, there is a hell of a lot to learn in it.

Iraqis pick up on the obvious

How much is a security guaranty backed only by Bush's word worth?

Not much.

Interesting Analysis

M K Bhadrakumar has an interesting review in Asia Times of Iran's role in Basra.  There is a lot of quote-worthy material, such as his puzzlement over Iran's modesty:

In the highly competitive world of international politics, nation states very rarely miss an opportunity to crow about success stories. The opportunity comes rare, mostly by default, and seldom enduring. By any standards of showmanship, therefore, Tehran has set a new benchmark of reticence.

The real money quote though is on the Bush administration:

 

Out of the dramatic developments of the past week, several questions arise, the principal being that the Bush administration's triumphalism over the so-called Iraq "surge" strategy has become irredeemably farcical, and, two, US doublespeak has become badly exposed. What stands out is that Washington promoted the latest round of violence in Basra, whereas Iran cried halt to it. The awesome influence of Tehran has become all too apparent. How does Bush come to terms with it?

How indeed?

Surprisingly smart op-ed on Afghanistan

Courtesy of Foreign Affairs:

Benjamin Friedman has a good op-ed in the Christian Science Monitor.  He criticizes the field of presidential candidates for seeking to expand the western troop presence in Afghanistan, either through NATO or the American military. 

His point in a nutshell- foreign military power is no substitute for a legitimate federal government.  The US doesn't need a large occupation force to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and military forces are terribly ineffective at nation building.  Hence sending in more troops is a waste of lives and money. 

Friedman does not dwell on the political calculus that encourages both parties to support escalation, but it's not hard to see.  First there is a perception that while Iraq is 'lost' Afghanistan can still be 'won', and having more troops there increases the chance of winning.  Afghanistan is salve and distraction from our losses in Iraq.  Escalation also serves as political cover; candidates who would withdraw troops from Iraq can still claim the mantle of militarism by sending them elsewhere.  There is a third reason for sending troops to Afghanistan, one that somewhat undermines Friedman's argument.

I'd argue that eastern Afghanistan and Pakistan are more important to America's national security then Iraq.  First, Pakistan is an unstable country with nuclear weapons.  Anything is possible there, and a significant area troop presence creates options.  Second, the worst people are there.  Osama Bin Laden and his followers, the people who actually did attack the U.S., are there.  More troops permit more effective cordon and search operations.  In sum, Afghanistan and Pakistan possess real WMD, and real people who have demonstrated the will and ability to launch attacks on U.S. soil.  Iraq (and Iran) possess neither.

That's a relatively small problem though, because that only works if you think military forces in Afghanistan won't be used for nation building, and they almost certainly will be.  It's worth thinking about what that is likely to accomplish.

WaPo Op-Ed

Here is an Op-Ed by Bruce Ackerman and Oona Hathaway from the Washington Post. It discusses current negotiations between the Bush Administration and Iraq over establishing a new status of force agreement. Democrats claim (quite plausibly) that Bush is pushing language that amounts to a security guaranty for the government of Iraq. Democrats claim such an agreement would bind future presidents to continue the current policy of large force occupation. I think the Op-Ed and most debate on this issue is missing something.

Forget about the validity of the claims, and consider how easily a presidential candidate could kneecap such a contract on their own by simply announcing their intentions with respect to Iraq. Put out a statement saying that any promise of a long term security guaranty by Bush isn't worth the paper it's printed on, and that if elected you would on the first day order a bottom up policy review of everything in force. I understand that Iraq policy is toxic waste so long as Bush is in office, but that ends when the new person comes in. Whoever it is, they should not be allowed to blame bad policy on ghosts.

Book Note

A note from my reading of Ghost Wars.

People talk a lot now about how nihilistic terrorists are, that they have no strategic purpose beyond killing. Killing without purpose is dishonorable and disgusting. That pretty well describes the Afghan mission in it's first phase- shedding blood because they could.

Coll describes a cultural shift in the CIA, wherein old school Yale types retire and the new school comes in. The new school were people who spent the 60's in service, rather then in college. It was a markedly more conservative, Republican, and presumably anti-communist mindset.

I imagine these were people who kept wondering why America held back during Vietnam. You have the even darker years of the 70's, and then Reagan rides in with the sun at his back and everyone says "now we can do what should be done", and miraculously the Soviets walk into a dark alley blindfolded and are just sitting there waiting to get popped. They were meat on a plate.

Is that how they see our troops in Iraq?

Another Take

Glenn Greenwald takes on the same issue as Bacevich, albeit with more vitriol.

Synopsis of the moral issue:

...until we stop operating on the premise that the world is our playground to run and control through military force -- for invasions, bombing campaigns, wars and occupations to be commenced whenever we perceive it to be in our "interests," however broadly that might be defined -- the only real question is how quickly these problems are going to worsen, how severely the accompanying erosion of our national character will become. A country that is defined by endless war and world military hegemony is inevitably, unavoidably, the Nation of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib and Torture and Renditions and Limitless Presidential Power and Secret Black Sites and Blackwater. You can't have one without the other.

Good Bacevich Op-Ed

Andrew Bacevich has a good Op-Ed in the Washington Post on the truth and consequences of escalation in Iraq.

Look beyond the spin, the wishful thinking, the intellectual bullying and the myth-making. The real legacy of the surge is that it will enable Bush to bequeath the Iraq war to his successor...

Remember when it was considered politically possible to withdraw troops from Iraq? A time when it was politically possible to at least TALK about our purpose in maintaining the occupation of Iraq?

Book Analysis and Notes: Losing Iraq

I finished reading Losing Iraq and put up some notes. I had low expectations for this, and was actually pleasantly surprised by the material on the Kurds. The rest was plain vanilla, but at least it was well written.

My basic questions going in:

- How well prepared at the outset does the author think we were? Does he put stock in the joint planning committee work? I've heard that panned in numerous contexts.

Answer: I got the sense that Phillips blamed the lack of pre-war planning and particularly the lack of a reality-based concept of Iraqi government. He didn't condemn the opposition comittee, but he didn't try to hide the fact that it was basically useless. That's in contravention to the myth that the State Department had all these great plans that the DOD tossed. Not to excuse the DOD, who were operating in fantasy land.

- What does he consider the worst errors, and who was responsible?

Answer:

1) Cheney and his people, for assuming authority but not responsibility over the opposition groups, and generally making things worse.

2) Chalabi, for lying about his support in Iraq.

3) Zalmay Khalizad, for preventing Iran from playing a legitimate role in Iraq early on when it could have made a difference.

Phillips cited an Iraqi academic as being a smart guy, I'll see if I can find anything he wrote post-war.

So... About those benchmarks

Here's a story from the Washington Post on cooperation between a Sunni militia and American forces. Official Iraqi federal and civil forces are completely absent from the story (and presumably the area in question).

- It's good to see our military recognizing and co-opting real local power over theoretical federal or state forces.

- It's surprising to see no mention of special forces. Isn't this their bag?

- It's unsurprising to see confusion and reluctance between our forces and the militia. Under the circumstances, neither side has reason to trust the other. The solution is to have minimal involvement- lay down some rules using arms supplies as the carrot and then stay out of the way. You can't provide effective operational support if you can't distinguish friend from foe, so don't try. And don't try to turn them into a scout force to guide our own operations. They want to save their neighborhoods, not watch us blow them up.

- Does anyone care that we're actively undermining some of the benchmarks we just signed into law?

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security.

Iraq Benchmarks - Actuals

Congress passed a new bill authorizing extra spending on military operations in Iraq, and it's been signed into law. They have not changed at all from the previous version I reviewed here, and it includes the get-out-of-jail-free card for Bush pushed by Sen. Warner.

The benchmarks, from HR 2206, Title 1 section 1314 (b) 1.

There are two noteworthy processes included in the legislation.

One, it requires the Comptroller General to review the benchmarks in parallel with the President. That position is currently held by David M. Walker. He (and the GAO) are independent of the President, he works for Congress and there is at least the potential for an interesting comparison of his answers to the President's.

Second, is this provision in section 1314 (d) :

(d) Redeployment of U.S. Forces From Iraq- The President of the United States, in respecting the sovereign rights of the nation of Iraq, shall direct the orderly redeployment of elements of U.S. forces from Iraq, if the components of the Iraqi government, acting in strict accordance with their respective powers given by the Iraqi Constitution, reach a consensus as recited in a resolution, directing a redeployment of U.S. forces.

That seems like a straightforward requirement that we withdraw or disengage if the Iraqi parliament passes a bill asking us to. I think that is more likely then Congress passing a withdrawal bill.

Gordon Smith supported it. My thoughts on the bill haven't changed, I give credit to Wyden for opposing it.

Iraq Benchmarks

Here are the benchmarks proposed by John Warner. This amendment got shot down, but I'm posting these because there is far too little discussion of what the benchmarks actually ought to be. To put the question differently, what actions should we encourage (or coerce) the Iraq government into pursuing? My comments are in red.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONING OF FUTURE UNITED STATES STRATEGY IN IRAQ ON THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S RECORD OF PERFORMANCE ON ITS BENCHMARKS.

(a) IN GENERAL.--(1) The United States strategy in Iraq, hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi government meeting benchmarks, as told to members of Congress by the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and reflected in the Iraqi Government's commitments to the United States, and to the international community, including:

(A) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the Constitutional review; [What, so we can have another national vote? Haven't we established that Iraqi elections contribute nothing to stability? More pictures of purple thumbs do not cut it.]

(B) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification; [This is meaningless. De-Baathification could mean anything from genocide to total amnesty. What does the U.S. want done with former Baathists? Answer that before you push this.]

(C) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources of the people of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; [Because there isn't enough corruption in Iraq, and oil companies aren't making enough money.]

(D) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions; [What does this mean? How big are the regions? Is this just a sop to the Kurds? Besides the Kurds, are there any regional authorities capable of managing better then the feds?]

(E) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission; provincial elections law; provincial council authorities; and a date for provincial elections; [See comments on (A)]

(F) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty; [Amnesty can be a useful tool in counter-insurgency. Assuming it's done right, i.e. part of a program that provides jobs and income to former combatants, this could help.]

(G) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the Constitution of Iraq; [This is clearly NOT something that can be accomplished with legislation.]

(H) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan; [Huh? I'll give Warner a pass and assume Iraqis will know what he's talking about. I'll even further assume this will somehow encourage insurgents and militias to throw down their weapons and sing Kumbaya.]

(I) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations; [I think this was supposed to have happened three months ago, but better late then never.]

(J) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions, in consultation with U.S commanders, without political intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias; [For the sake of argument, let's assume that currently Iraqi commanders do not have authority to make tactical and operational decisions without political intervention, and that if they had such authority they would use it to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Given the overlap between militias and the government at all levels, wouldn't this of necessity require the Iraqi military to launch a coup? We can encourage a coup, it may not even be the worst strategy now, but why exactly would we encourage the Iraqi Government to encourage a coup against itself?]

(K) Ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces are providing even handed enforcement of the law; [Let's see, a benchmark that cannot be reasonably measured and is no one's responsibility. Yeah, that will work. ]

(L) Ensuring that, according to President Bush, Prime Minister Maliki said ``the Baghdad security plan will not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or political affiliation''; [This makes no sense as written. Assuming it's supposed to mean no amnesty for militias and insurgents, doesn't it directly contradict item F above? ]

(M) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating militia control of local security; [See comments on (K)]

(N) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; [Works for me.]

(O) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently; [Works for me.]

(P) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected; [This furthers our objectives by...?]

(Q) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an equitable basis; and [This would work if it could be verified that the money wasn't going into someone's pocket. I don't see why we're benchmarking the funding level at all, shouldn't the focus be on ensuring the funds go to the specified purposes?]

(R) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF. [Seriously? This is a problem so pressing it needs to be addressed in the benchmarks, our last best hope for securing a good outcome in Iraq? See comments on (J).]

Of the proposed benchmarks I saw 4 (F, I, N, O) that were useful, and three that could be useful(D, H, Q). So out of 18 proposed benchmarks 11 are useless or worse.

I think Congress ought to have a debate and resolution defining benchmarks for success before we try to implement them. I think everyone can agree that for benchmarks to work, they need to be

1) Clearly defined.

2) Advance our highest priority objectives in Iraq.

3) Be assigned to specific positions or groups, i.e. national congress, Prime Minister, Leader of ISF, etc.

4) Be measurable.

5) Be achievable by the assigned party.

Is this really such a foreign concept to the Senate?

Recommended Podcast

After Words: Ali Allawi Interviewed by Roland Flamini
Broadcast by C-Span

Ali Allawi has published a commentary on Iraq, the first I've seen by an Iraqi. I've seen him featured as a speaker on other podcasts, but found the C-Span interview the most informative. The key points I heard were
- Many people including exile groups thought Iraq had a strong secular middle class. That was true pre 1981, but was no longer so in 2003.

- Not only did America not have a plan when it invaded Iraq, it did not have a plan even when it put in place the CPA. The CPA had no clear mission statement but had tons of resources and authority. Hence the meandering through 2004. [Side Note: the unwillingness or inability of the President to provide meaningful direction to American occupation forces is still in evidence today as they search for a 'war czar']

- A with drawl of American forces would not make a significant difference. In areas of mixed ethnicity fighting would continue, in areas of ethnic homogeneity there would be no fighting. That is essentially the current situation.